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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law & Alternative Dispute Resolution at the International Hellenic 
University.  
The European Banking Union was proposed by the Commission in 2012 as a 
portion of the long-term mission for fiscal integration aiming at the restoration of 
confidence in eurozone. The plan was intended to be implemented gradually with a 
shift of the banks’ supervision to a European level, with an establishment of a common 
framework responsible for crisis management as well as with a shared system for 
deposit insurance. The first two measures have been implemented so far but the third 
measure remains the missing pillar of such a Union. A backed European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme would be the best protection that could be added to the national 
deposits guarantee structures which are estimated €100,000 per account and bank.  
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Introduction 
It is widely known that the financial system in Europe is dominated by banks, as 
they are the structures which offer the majority of credit to enterprises and 
households. It is expected that they can ease investment and financial development. 
Up to the previous years, the banking system of each European Member State was 
supervised and regulated only at a national level, but according to the recent 
developments during the financial crisis, these arrangements were found not to 
provide satisfactory steadiness in the financial system.  
A “European Banking Union” seems to be the finest solution for the fiscal 
system’s weaknesses. According to Gros and Shoenmaker (2014), such a union would 
provide the best desirable outcomes in the financial system. Firstly, the systemic risk 
will be reduced. In national banking, the focus is on national interests and the joined 
value of banks is ignored, while a “Banking Union” would absorb the potential failures 
of the system at a European level. Furthermore, a Banking Union could separate 
national governments from the banks, as it would include a safety net guaranteeing 
the solidity of the structure independently from any national weaknesses. It could act 
as a mechanism which both shocks the system and absorbs its failures and succeed in 
preventing potential failures by appropriate regulation or even managing a potential 
crisis. 
A unified banking system requires single bank supervision, single bank 
resolution and single deposit insurance.  While the two pillars of the European Banking 
Union are in place (single supervision and single resolution), deposit insurance still 
remains national.  Although proposals for the centralization of deposit insurance were 
made many years ago, it became a hot topic during the Eurozone crisis; IMF published 
a paper in 2010 anticipating a unified European deposit insurance system and 
European Commission finally issued a proposal for a Regulation establishing a 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) in 2015. Since then very few steps of 
progress have been made, while the proposal has been highly criticized and raised 
many political debates in the EU. 
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The aim of this paper would be to examine the “Single Supervisory Mechanism” 
and the “Single Resolution Mechanism” along with their legal framework and then 
focus on the proposal of the European Commission regarding the “European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme”. Its purposes, the steps of its enactment as well as the advantages 
and disadvantages related to it would be taken into consideration in order for the 
concept of EDIS to be fully understood, since it is a significant area which bothers the 
European Community. 
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The European Banking Union 
The Banking Union is a key element of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) and is a step of high significance towards financial integration in Europe.  
As stated in Five Presidents' Report  "Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary 
Union" (June 2015) "A single banking system is the mirror image of a single money.” 
The principles of the establishment of a Banking Union 
Looking back on the recent European banking history, there are many 
indicative cases where the lack of a real Banking Union proved to be inefficient. The 
case of Fortis, an important bank for both the Netherlands and Belgium, is an example 
indicating the failure of the national states’ co-ordination especially during a financial 
crisis. After the economic crisis of 2008 broke up, Fortis was highly affected. However, 
national interests of each State preceded the European ones regarding the approach 
proposed so as to save Fortis (Berck, 2012). With the local parliaments guiding political 
choices for both counties, Belgium wanted to save the whole bank and keep its base in 
the capital of Belgium while the Dutch government wanted to divide the bank. In this 
instance, a federal alternative solution should have been required, since a unified 
market such as the European has the potential to absorb the systematic consequences 
of banking failures. 
 A further issue in European Union is the impact of the stress of one of its 
members to the whole banking system. For instance, Ireland is a case where domestic 
real estate market led to significant losses which could not be covered by its national 
sovereign and its national deposit guarantee system. According to Gros (2012) Ireland 
share some important features with Nevada, such as the size of their population and 
the strong flourishment of their real estate market. However, when the market 
stopped flourishing, Nevada and Ireland experienced the crisis differently as in United 
States banking system issues are solved at a federal level whereas in the European 
Union banking problems used to remain the responsibility of the national states. This is 
an indicative example of the different results of each approach. In Nevada, the banks’ 
failures were seized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation which absorbed the 
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losses and gave the operations to banks that were more powerful. An equivalent 
banking system in European Union could have rescued Ireland’s banking system (Grow 
& Shoenmaker, 2014). 
Hence a national deposit guarantee system created by the eurozone could not 
only offer a mechanism which absorbs external losses, but it would be totally 
independent of the national sovereign. Thus, a mechanism like that would be very 
important during an economic crisis eruption as it could prevent the deep recession, 
the creation of uncontrollable deficits and the public debt’s growing levels.  
Crisis management 
Countries have had certain mechanisms which helped them lend the insolvent 
banks. However, it could be possible that problematic banks exceeded the available 
resources. In this case, central banks would have to lend money even when their role is 
just to lessen the risk. Thus, the European Central Bank could not be the appropriate 
institution to become the lender of the last minute as it could not fully control the 
banks which used to be managed by the national government. There were problems of 
coordination which had to change, and this could be done only within a “Eurozone 
Banking System”. Authorities have to be informed about the money needed to avoid 
their banks’ failure because money of the taxpayers is included. The viability of a failing 
bank must be considered and in case of an emergency it would be better that 
problematic banks shut down in order to reduce the impact on the deposits.  
As bank crises were tending to explode and spread throughout the whole fiscal 
sector, it became obvious that the decisions should be quick and the authorities should 
be prepared and well informed. Many developed states had already created 
institutions which had the role of the supervisor and resolution authorities which had 
the responsibility to restructure the bank or shut them down in case of failure. In the 
case of Eurozone countries back then, it used to be one central bank but no supervisor 
(Wyplosz, 2012). 
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The benefits of a Banking Union 
The Banking Union is an idea that appeared in economists’ discussions many 
years ago, but it was after the last financial crisis that it was moved up. However, 
despite the wide acceptance of it as a necessity for the future of eurozone, it was not 
clear from the beginning what exactly a “Banking Union” would be and how it would 
function within the Eurozone. Nonetheless, authors agreed that there would be a 
union with a central supervision- as the national supervision worsens the situation- 
and it was considered to be part of a package with reforms associated with the 
entanglement of banks with sovereign. Additionally, it was implied that there would be 
long-term reforms which would address the sovereign fragility. 
According to the “Five Presidents’ Report”, a Banking Union is a central 
movement towards the implementation of an Economic as well as a Monetary Union 
which will have the capacity to offer a more satisfying life to EU residents. The basic 
mission of such a union is to stop the association between states’ banking systems and 
their taxpayers. In this way, a failing banking system would not be able to influence 
negatively the public debt and vice versa. 
One of the most important benefits of a Banking Union will be the protection 
against instability of banks. “Deposit Guarantee Schemes” are designated to protect 
individuals from bank bankruptcy and in this way, eliminate the possibility of general 
bank runs which were significant during the last financial crisis. Nevertheless, current 
“Deposit Guarantee Scheme” is exposed to instability because of its national character. 
A common insurance scheme would have the potential to increase flexibility against 
possible crises in the future (Nouy, 2016). Therefore, it was proposed by the five 
President’s report to establish a “European Deposit Insurance Scheme” as a pillar of a 
settled Banking Union. 
An additional benefit of the Banking Union is the reduced consequences of a 
bank failure for taxpayers, since a shared euro scheme is likely to be financially neutral 
and not national as with Deposit Guarantee Schemes. For this measure to take place, it 
is imperative to determine the minimum amount of officially required national deposit 
insurances and then proceed to the design of cross-country ones. A very influential 
aspect of a common Scheme would be the independency of it from state’s policies. 
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Nonetheless, this feature may create issues with incentives as a common liability 
attracts officials to dump costs on other countries (Schoenmaker et al, 2016). 
Finally, it is imperative to be defined whether the Banking Union would be just 
for the Eurozone or for all countries which participate in the European Union. 
According to Beck (2012), the need for a unified banking system is much more intense 
within the currency union as there is tight association between the fiscal and monetary 
stability. This is impaired by national authorities which do not possess the necessary 
tools that countries with monetary independency already have. However, it appears 
that non-eurozone countries could participate in the Union, but they would not have 
the same benefits and responsibilities that the members of the eurozone have. In 
general, it is stressed that there is a need to involve all banks, even small ones. In this 
case, European Central Bank would be the creditor of the last minute for the whole 
banking system but it would have the right and responsibility to resolve and supervise 
all the banks of the union (Beck, 2012). 
The risks of a Banking Union 
The urgency for the creation of a Banking Union came from the idea that a 
safety net for Europe was not complete. The European Central Bank has become the 
main lender although it has inadequate information about national banks. Also, 
national governments tend to recapitalize their banks admitting more and more 
pressure to the European Central Bank to take measures (Beck, 2012).  
On the other hand, the ECB’s dual role includes conflicts of interests. For 
instance, financial policy and steadiness measures are significantly in accordance but 
there is a potential risk associated with the fact that the ECB will be the sole liquidity 
provider. Furthermore, there are risks concerning the potential conflicts between the 
two domains of activity of the Central Bank and the legal risks which permit some kind 
of scrutiny (European Central Bank, 2013). 
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The two main pillars of the European Banking Union 
The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) along with the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) is established as the two main pillars of the “European Banking 
Union” providing single supervision and single resolution.  
The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
 
The Supervision of the credit institutions within the Eurozone is substantial as it 
helps restructure the trust within the banking sector and ensure the flexibility of the 
credit institutions. The last fiscal crisis depicted how fast and intensely can financial 
problems spread within a monetary union and how crisis can affect the citizens of 
Eurozone countries. 
The purposes of the SSM are to shield the European banking institutes, upsurge 
fiscal unity and solidity and guarantee steady management. It has the ability to make 
the banking sector more integrated and offer a risk-orientated and balanced 
supervisory style.  
 The SSM consists of the banking supervision structure which comprises of the 
ECB and the National Supervisory Authorities which partake in the Eurozone.  
The function of the ECB would be to establish an approach which is the same 
for all members maintaining a balance between the measures that it takes and the 
supervisory activity and ensuring that the regulations and policies apply consistently to 
all members. Its main responsibility is the direct supervision of important banks of the 
countries which are members of the Eurozone. The criteria according to which a credit 
institution is considered significant are associated with its size, financial importance, 
cross-border assets/liabilities, financial assistance, etc. Moreover, the ECB is 
authorized to accomplish supervisory evaluations, inspections as well as investigations, 
provide or revoke banking licenses, evaluate banks’ qualifying holdings, make sure the 
banking institution comply with the European Union rules and set higher buffer to 
avoid fiscal risks. 
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Comprehensive assessment is one more function of the Central Bank which 
advances its supervisory tasks. According to its additional role, the ECB will assess the 
banks in order to achieve a greater transparency of their functions and expand the 
information about them that becomes available. The aim is to build confidence. There 
are three aspects which are fundamental. The first is the assessment of risks like 
liquidity and funding, the second is to ensure the exposures of the bank such as the 
quality of assets that involves and the last aspect is the stress test which investigates 
the balance sheets of it in case of risk (ECB Press Release, 2013). 
 The access to the expertise of the Central Bank has the potential to ensure the 
quality of the processes associated with decision-making and increase the effective 
outcomes of the mechanism. The supervision will not be provided freely as the banks 
will be charged with fees (European Central Bank, 2013). 
However, the effectiveness and consistency of the Supervision of the European 
credit institutions are not safeguarded only by ECB; collaboration of it with the 
National Supervisors of the participant states is required. There are credit institutions- 
that are considered less significant- which are supervised indirectly by the national 
authorities, though in tight cooperation with the Central Bank.  
The countries which partake automatically in the SSM are those of Eurozone 
while other countries of the European Union can either participate or not. However, if 
they want to participate, the national supervisors have to tightly cooperate with the 
ECB. If there are countries which do not take part in the SSM, then a memorandum 
clarifies the cooperation of the Central Bank with the countries’ national supervisors 
on aspects of their credit institutions’ supervision (European Central Bank). 
 The successful implementation of the SSM will ensure that the banks will be 
protected by eliminating the national bias. Thus, the implementation of SSM depends 
on several actions such as the proper scoping of the jurisdictions of every Member 
State as all their banks will have to cooperate with the ECB and be supervised by it.
 The SSM has as a basis the construction of a powerful center which has the 
support of ECB and where the tasks between the center and the periphery of it are 
adequately allocated. The Central Bank will be responsible for the function of the 
system but the operationalization of it will be the responsibility of the national 
authorities since they are closer to the banking institutions that are supervised as well 
  -9- 
as more expertise. When the Banks are supervised by the ECB directly, officers from 
the national authorities will be present in the inspections of the ECB. Hence, there 
would be joint teams representing both the ECB and the national authorities which will 
be responsible for the process (European Commission, 2013). 
 The financial crisis in the Eurozone area has reinforced the tendency of the 
banks which are supervised to benefit from the interactions between financial policy 
and management. The assignment of supervisory mechanisms to the ECB reflects the 
leading agreement in many national authorities. The benefits from the interaction of 
financial policy and managements stem from the distribution of information 
associated with the financial policy, the supervision of the credit institutions and the 
omission of payment mechanisms. Moreover, the significant banks can take advantage 
from the expertise associated with the analysis of financial stability and the 
independence of credit institutions which have evidently defined guidelines of liability 
and can have a positive contribution to the successful conduct of monetary stability 
processes. 
 The implementation of SSM started at the last months of 2015 when the 
“European Banking Institute” was established. EBI is a structure counterpart to the 
SSM and consists of a net of universities from the whole Europe. This institute gives 
the change to the academic and professional world to meet and share their views 
about the legal procedures behind SSM and EBU.  
An important advantage of the whole process is the contribution of SSM in the 
upgrade of a Single Market, where all European banks take part recognizing the 
limitations of each national law. The legal framework aims to balance the way the SSM 
works.  
However, national differences have been the main issue behind the 
establishment of a “balanced legal and regulatory framework by the European 
Commission” and the “European Banking Authority (EBA)”. There are supervisory 
procedures which are regulated by national law. For instance, the “Capital 
Requirements Directive” is a mechanism allowing the Member States to select the way 
and the process of implementation. Thus, there are provisions of it that function in a 
different way for each member.  
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 Unfortunately, there are countries where non-compulsory supervisory 
procedures within compulsory legal acts existed, therefore making it more difficult for 
the Central Bank to balance these procedures. An illustrating example is associated 
with German law which regulated the resolution of credit institutions. According to it, 
the Ministry of Finance had still the authority to establish regulations like risk 
management (European Commission, 2013). 
According to Lautenschläger (2016) the regulatory procedures in Eurozone area 
displayed an image of fragmentation, but national law has not the right to differentiate 
from SSM. If there are different supervisory styles, then the two styles (the national 
and the European) have to merge in a way that the whole process would function 
appropriately. A consistent style and a common rulebook are the landmarks which can 
help the system to work sufficiently.   
The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) 
However, the SSM cannot function alone; it needs to be supplemented by the 
SRM in order to provide its services to credit institutions that are not viable. 
Otherwise, the SSM may encourage a type of supervision that has its basis on the 
expectations of the ECB associated with granting liquidity. It would not be possible to 
avoid having banks which are in trouble. Thus, an SRM is needed to make sure that 
credit institutions that are not viable will be resolved (European Central Bank, 2013). 
According to the decisions of the European Commission, the Single Resolution 
Mechanism is a central organization for the resolution of credit institutions within the 
European Union and one of the two pillars of the European Banking Union. The term 
resolution refers to the reorganization of a credit institution by a resolution 
mechanism when it is about to fail. This mechanism makes sure that the failure of the 
credit institution would not spread or influence negatively the broader financial system 
or cause any kind of fiscal instability.  
The Single Resolution Mechanism can be applied only to institutions which are 
supervised by the European Central Bank and therefore, are protected by the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism. In the case where a credit institution that has received the 
supervision of the Single Supervisory Mechanism fails, the Single Resolution 
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Mechanism gives the chance for its resolution to be managed through a Single 
Resolution Board and a Single Resolution Fund which is financed by the wider banking 
sector.  
The aim of the Single Resolution Mechanism is to protect taxpayers and the 
European economy from the possible costs that a failing credit institution could bring. 
This measure is associated with the fiscal crisis which broke out in 2007-2008 and 
spread around the world affecting taxpayers and governments whose credit 
institutions were failing as there were not any resolution and crisis management 
frameworks for similar situations. These developments following the fiscal crisis 
suggested that a different approach was mandatory for the management of the 
banking sector’s crisis and the provision of a fiscal stability (European Commission, 
2016).  
The Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 which establishes the Single Resolution 
Mechanism creates a framework for the resolution of the credit institution within the 
European Union. The most important authority established by the above Regulation is 
the “Single Resolution Board” which acts as an autonomous resolution mechanism 
within the European banking sector. The Single Resolution Mechanism is composed by 
the Single Resolution Board and the states that participate in the Eurozone. The aim of 
the Single Resolution Board is to safeguard the European economy and the citizens’ 
credit from the failing credit institution within the European Banking Union and 
accomplish the “Single Resolution Fund” (European Commission, 2015). 
It is critical to protect the temporary and impartial decisions that are taken by 
the national authorities in these situations. The SRM has the potential to ensure that 
taxpayers will not pay for the preservation of non-viable banking institutions as in an 
economy where the private market dominates, the credit institutions cannot be 
protected from closing if they are not viable. However, these procedures need to be 
orderly and not to be influenced by national bias. This mechanism must be placed 
within the Central Bank in order to avoid any upcoming conflict of objectives. From an 
institutional view, the SRM should follow the similar procedures with the SSM. The 
responsibility of the mechanism would be to govern the resolution of credit institution 
and coordinate the implementation of resolution apparatuses. 
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 One of the most critical components of banking resolution is funding. Hence, 
there is a need for the establishment of efficient financial measures. In order to 
achieve this, a European Resolution Fund has to be established so as to offer the 
necessary funding when it is required. In case the resources provided by the above 
Fund are not adequate, then funding should be provided by the European Union back-
stop mechanism (European Central Bank, 2013). 
The Legal Framework behind SSM and SRM 
The Single Supervisory Mechanism’s establishment took place on 4/11/2014 
and represented a fundamental step towards the Banking Union’s establishment. A 
whole set of legal acts had to be adopted for the founding of Single Supervisory 
Mechanism in a short period of time. The involvement of the legal services of the 
Central Bank of Europe was substantial in the establishment of a series of Legal 
Booklets related to the legal framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. 
Particularly, the series of Legal Booklets encompasses the most important legal acts 
associated with the administration of the Banking Union together with other legal acts 
associated with other European institutions such as the Council regulation.  
The Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation includes the founding principles 
and general rules associated with the function of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. It 
also made clear which are the tasks of the European Central Bank in the area of 
supervision of banking entities. The Central Bank has the responsibility for setting the 
standards of supervision of the banking sector and collaborating with the national 
competent authorities. Furthermore, it sets the criteria for the determination of 
significance. In other words, it contains the methodology according to which a banking 
institution is determined as significant or not as well as the procedures underlying the 
cooperation between the Central Bank and the National Competent Authorities with a 
concern to which banking institutions are significant or not. Finally, it includes issues 
associated with the macro-prudential choices, close collaboration, investigatory 
supremacy, sanction, qualifying properties and authorizations.  
 Additionally, it provides for a Supervisory Board, which would be the internal 
body of the Central Bank and would be responsible for the design and execution of the 
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Central Banks’ tasks. According to the Single Supervisory Mechanism’ Regulation, it is 
imperative to adopt rules which set out the cooperation with the Supervisory Board. 
More specifically, the new rubrics create the relationship between the Supervisory 
Board and the Governing Council under a procedure called non-objection procedure. 
This procedure requires that the informal decisions of the Supervisory Board become 
official if the Governing Council does not object within a defined period of time. 
Furthermore, the Regulation requires the adoption of Supervisory Board’s 
specific Rules of Procedure. The Central Bank’s and the Supervisory Board’s Rules of 
Procedure were available on the Central Bank’s site and published on Institutional 
Provisions, a separate legal booklet in June 2015. The Regulation founds an 
Administrative Board of Review set by the Central Bank of Europe which is charged 
with the responsibility for the formation of administrative reviews of the Central 
Bank’s supervisory tasks’ decisions. The Administrative Board of Review is responsible 
for the review of the decisions upon the Central Bank’s request and it will consist of 
five experts with significant experience in the financial and banking services.  
The Regulation establishes an additional internal body called the Mediation 
Panel with the aim to ensure the division between the supervisory tasks and the 
monetary policy. Additionally, this body will be responsible to deal with any opposition 
of the Central Council associated with the informal decisions of the Supervisory Board. 
The rules related to the decision of the Supervisory Board  and the cooperation with 
the Governing Council are regulated by the legal services which are created by the 
Mediation Panel, the Administrative Board of Reviews and the rules associated with 
the separation of the Central Bank’s function of monetary policy and its supervisory 
tasks.  
There is also a procedure according to which there will be a chance for the 
Member States which are not in the eurozone to become members of the Banking 
Union. The decision encompasses the procedures related to the requests to cooperate 
closely with the Central Bank, the requests’ assessment by the Bank and the 
assessment’s outcome. Once cooperation is established, the Framework Regulation is 
responsible for the operation of the cooperation and the forms of supervision that is to 
be conducted (European Commission, 2015). 
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Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 
 
According to the Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 the European Commission 
suggested a Single Supervisory Mechanism which encompasses the Central Bank of 
Europe. The President of the European Council -in association with the President of the 
Central Bank and the European Commission- was asked to develop a particular plan for 
the creation of a monetary and financial union which encompasses specific proposals 
related to the well-being of the fiscal services within the internal market. The primary 
phase towards the formation of the Banking Union within the Eurozone is the 
construction of a single supervisory mechanism supported by a single set of directions 
for the fiscal services as well as a novel basis for resolution and deposit insurance. 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 provides the Central Bank with particular tasks 
associated with the practical supervision of banking institutions in the Members of 
Eurozone and permits the other Associates of the Union that are not in the Eurozone 
to form a tight collaboration with the Central Bank. Member States whose banking 
institutions are administered by the Central Bank should not hamper the function of 
financial services in the internal market. The Banking Authority of Europe should 
preserve its role according to the Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 and maintain its 
current powers and responsibilities associated with the rules which apply to all 
Members of the Eurozone (European Commission, 2015). 
Furthermore, the involvement of mechanisms of democratic accountability are 
critical as well as the insurance of the security and reliability of banking institutions. 
The Central Bank should be fully conscious for the multiplicity of banking institutions, 
their business models, their magnitude and the welfares associated with the diversity 
within the banking industry in Europe. 
 The promotion of the most effective supervisory practice within the market is 
essential to combine the single rulebook with the supervision of the credit institutions 
carried out by the Central Bank together with the National Competent Authorities. The 
supervisory handbook should find the most effective practices associated with 
processes and methodologies to accomplish adherence to central Union and 
international principles. This handbook should include all the tasks of the Central 
Bank’s responsibility without taking the form of legal acts. These tasks might include: 
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the protection of the consumer, the money laundering’s fight, the establishment of 
methodologies and metrics for the assessment of any risk. 
 Additionally, the Regulation establishes that the Central Bank of Europe could 
ask for information from the credit institutions associated with anything that is legally 
acceptable such as information held by people paid by these credit institutions to 
accomplish important activities, inspections provided to those credit institutions by 
outside inspectors as well as copies of significant books, records and documents. 
 Moreover, according to the Regulation the Central Bank of Europe would 
request for information with full justification. When there are objections by the 
addressees, they would still provide the information despite the objections. The 
decision would be taken by the European Union’s Court of Justice in agreement with 
established procedures. Concerns associated with Central Bank’s governance should 
be considered. Additionally, the European Banking Authority would have the leading 
role in the Single Supervisory Mechanism and it would be equipped with the necessary 
instruments in order to complete the tasks that it is responsible for. The members of 
the European Union would participate in the European Banking Authority with equal 
rights. 
 According to the Central Bank’s supervisory tasks specified by the Regulation 
(EU) No 1024/2013, the European Banking Authority would have the responsibility to 
accomplish tasks which are related both to the Central Bank and the National 
Competent Authorities. More specifically, the current mechanism which settle the 
emergency actions and disagreements would be adjusted according to the needs of 
the particular situation in order to remain sufficient. 
 The European Banking Authority should be perfectly informed about the last 
developments in order to ensure its role as a facilitator and coordinator in case of 
emergency. Additionally, the National Competent Authorities would invite them to 
observe all the relevant meetings including the right to contribute accordingly or take 
the floor. 
 Furthermore, interests of the members are taken equally into consideration 
and consequently voting arrangements associated with the Board of Supervisors would 
be adapted in order for the European Banking Authority to function properly. An 
independent panel comprised of voting members from the Supervisors’ Board would 
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be responsible for any decisions associated with breaches of the regulations within the 
Union and the managing of incongruities.  Most of the associates who vote within the 
Supervisory Board should implement the decisions made by the panel which would 
encompass a simple majority of National Competent Authorities of Member States 
participating in the SSM. 
 The Board of Supervisors should adopt decisions associated with emergency 
actions including a simple majority of the members from both competent authorities 
of participating and non-participating States. In addition, decisions associated with acts 
which are specified in the Articles 10 to 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 and 
associated measures included in the third subparagraph of Chapter VI and Article 9 (5) 
of the particular Regulation should be adopted by the majority of the Supervisors of 
the Board along with a simple majority of its members from both National Competent 
Authorities of non-participating and participating members. Then, the European 
Banking Authority should create procedural rules for the panel which ensure its 
objectivity as well as interdependence (European Central Bank, 2013) . 
 Moreover, the Board Management would be composed of a proper and 
balanced representation of the Member States which do not participate in the Union 
and a geographical balance should be ensured for the appointment of the members of 
European Banking Authority committees and internal bodies. 
 The appropriate function of the European Boarding Authority as well as the 
depiction of all Member States would be ensured by the Management Board’s 
composition, the administration of the independent panel’ composition and the voting 
arrangements. These processes should be reviewed after a certain time period taking 
into consideration any developments and experiences that were relevant. Also, there 
would be no State that is a Union’s member that would be discriminated as a place for 
fiscal services. The European Banking Authority should be equipped with the necessary 
fiscal and human resources providing support in order to accomplish any additional 
tasks (Official Journal of The European Union, 2013). 
 From an institutional view, the above Regulation has the potential to offer 
particular protection against any conflict of interests which may preserve the attitude 
of separation of the financial policy and supervisory role of the ECB. The grouping of 
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the Central Bank’s function and supervision in one institute permits particular 
precautions to eliminate reputational risk (European Central Bank, 2013).  
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 
 
Through Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 the Single Supervisory Mechanism is 
recognized consiting of national authorities of the European Member States and the 
European Central Bank. The European Central Bank is recognized as the authority in 
charge for the sufficient running of the Single Supervisory Mechanism as well as for the 
functioning of the whole system. The Regulation gives the responsibility to the ECB to 
get involved in the credit institutions that are located in the Members of the European 
Union. Additionally, credit institutions, companies with financial holding, companies 
with mixed financial holding in EU members as well as branches of credit institution of 
EU members established in states outside EU, that are substantial, are supervised by 
the ECB.  
National Competition Authorities have the responsibility for the supervision of 
institutions that are less substantial. The Central Bank would have an investigating 
section which would function independently. However, complete cooperation 
between the National Competition Authorities and the Central Bank is mandatory for 
the efficacious running of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. It must be guaranteed 
that the two institutions would exchange the necessary information that may influence 
the respective tasks of the Single Supervisory Mechanism.  
The procedures are defined as well as time deadlines for the National 
Authorities’ preparation of assertions for the Central Bank linked to the supervision of 
substantial as well as less substantial entities. There should be a report of the 
European Central Bank for the practice of the supervision and additional evaluation if 
demanded by the Central Bank as well as the communication of the supervisory 
decisions to the Central Bank where it would state its views.  
Another domain where the Regulation establishes rules is information 
exchange and cooperation between the Central Bank and the Authorities of Member 
States at a national level concerning the procedures associated with the entities that 
are significant and less significant for supervision as well as the macro-prudential tools 
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and tasks. According to the Article 1 of the Regulation, the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism cooperation must involve: “A specific methodology for the classification of 
a supervised institution as being more or less significant” (European Commission, 
2015). In addition, further procedures that are regulated are related to the supervisory 
decisions adoption which is addressed to the entities supervised or other persons, the 
arrangements at a linguistic level between the Central Bank of Europe and National 
Competition Authorities as well as between the Bank and entities or persons which are 
under supervision. Finally, the Regulation does not influence the supervisory 
procedure and must be read together with Decision ECB.2004/2 and the Supervisory 
Board’s Rules of Procedure concerning decision-making in the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (European Central Bank, 2014). 
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 
 
The purpose of this Regulation is to give a structural definition of the Single 
Resolution Board. The Single Resolution Board is composed of a chair, a vice-chair and 
four members who are permanent as well as the authorities of the European Union 
countries which participate in the Single Resolution Board.  Its operation is narrowed 
into the executive sessions in which those who participate are the chair and four 
members as well as permanent observers posed by the European Central Bank and the 
European Commission and the plenary session which consists of the full board. 
According to the Regulation the act is applicable to eurozone countries; however other 
countries can participate as well. 
Some key points associated with the act are the definition of the Single 
Resolution Authority which is described as a Resolution Scheme put together by the 
board which should be approved by the European Commission in a crisis situation. In 
such a situation, the Scheme is going to be adopted in twenty-four hours presupposed 
that the European Commission does not have any objections. If the resolution scheme 
does not draw more than €5 billion from the single resolution fund, the decisions 
associated with it are taken in an executive board meeting comprised of the state 
authorities of the country whose bank is in a crisis. Then, the full board is the 
construction that takes the decisions (European Commission, 2013). 
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The Single Resolution Mechanism is a consultant structure which is comprised 
of the Single Resolution Authority and the Single Resolution fund. The Single 
Supervisory Mechanism together with the Single Resolution Mechanism comprises the 
basis of the European Banking Union and gives the supervisory tasks to the European 
Central Bank. The Single Resolution Mechanism is relevant to the Eurozone countries. 
However, other European Union countries have the right to contribute as well. 
The tasks of the Single Resolution authority have the accountability of the 
banks which are under the administration of the European Central Bank. The board is 
in charge for the cross-border institutions as well as the largest ones which are under 
the direct supervision of the Central Bank. The rest of the banks are under the 
supervision and unswerving responsibility of the national authorities as well as the 
secondary responsibility of the Central Bank. The Single Resolution Authority starts 
when the resolution theme must employ the Single Resolution Fund. 
The Act consists of the establishment of rules and procedures associated with 
the resolutions of banks and investment companies below the framework of a Single 
Resolution Mechanism and Fund. Other Acts related are the Regulation (EU) No 
1024/2013 which is linked to the tasks of the European Central Bank connected to the 
banks’ practical supervision policies, the “Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013” which 
establishes a European Supervision Authority and the “Regulation (EU) 2015/81” which 
stipulates the conditions where the “Regulation (EU) No 806/2013” is applied 
(European Central Bank, 2013). 
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The European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
European Commission’s proposal 
The Banking Union plans were launched in 2012 after the sovereign debt crisis 
of 2008 had affected the global economy and forced European countries to offer 2 
trillion euros in guarantees and capital in order to save the banks.  After the agreement 
for common supervision for those that lend eurozone, the nineteen states of eurozone 
lost momentum and were stuck in the deliberations about the founding of European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme. 
Nevertheless, on November 2015 there was an authorized proposal by the 
European Commission which modified the Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 to accomplish 
the establishment of a common insurance guarantee scheme. 
According to the descriptive note of the proposal, the establishment of the 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme comprises of the third pillar of the Union of the 
European credit institutions in three sequential segments: a reinsurance scheme for 
national DGSs which participate in the union in an initial period of three years, a co-
insurance scheme for the same group but this time for a second period of four years 
and full coverage for them in the steady state. A benefit from the European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme can be achieved only if the national DGSs have funds which are built 
up according to a specific funding path which complies with the fundamental 
requirements of the law of the Union. The monitoring of the national DGSs would be 
the responsibility of the Single Resolution Board which would release funds whenever 
it is well-defined that the conditions are met. The founding of European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme would be joint with procedures to eliminate risks in the financial 
sector of the members of the European Union. 
The context of the proposal was the call of the European Commission for the 
creation of a Banking Union in 2012, a step that had the potential to reestablish 
confidence in the Eurozone as part of the general mission for financial integration. The 
employment of the Union should be accomplished by providing the supervision to the 
European Central Bank, creating a common framework for crisis management within 
the banking sector and a shared system for deposit fortification. The first two phases 
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towards this direction are the founding of a Single Supervisory Mechanism and Single 
Resolution Mechanism and they have been already realized. Nonetheless, a common 
structure for the protection of deposits has not been implemented. 
The report by the Five Presidents as well as the European Commission’s 
response established a clear plan for the enhancement of the Economic & Monetary 
Union, encompassing movements to further eliminate risks to economic stability. The 
Banking Union would be the final step which would establish a complete and absolute 
Economic & Monetary Union. A completely integrated fiscal system is the key for the 
single’s currency efficiency concerning the spread of financial policy, sufficient risk 
sharing within the Eurozone and wide-ranging confidence in the banking sector of 
Eurozone. 
Predominantly, the repost of the Five Presidents recommends the 
establishment of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme in the longrun which would be 
the third prop of Banking Union along with the Single Supervisory Mechanism, which is 
accountable for the banks’ supervision, and the Single Resolution Mechanism, which is 
accountable for the resolution of banks having been surrogated to the Single 
Resolution Mechanism. 
The proposal is one of the first phases towards this direction with the purpose 
of creating a system which would be disconnected from the sovereign. The basic aim is 
the protection of the European citizens’ deposits which would be independed from 
their geographical location. Additionally, the Commission clarified that the creation of 
a reinsurance oriented approach would assess the various subsidy levels of the state 
schemes as well as their ethical peril issues. The formation of a joint Deposit Insurance 
fund would be accomplished by the Single Resolution Board. Additionally, the Deposit 
Insurance Scheme would be domineering for the Members of Eurozone as well as the 
associates who wish to join the European Banking Union. 
The “European Deposit Insurance Scheme” would progressively convert into a 
co-insurance scheme which would be fully mutualized in several years. This step is 
mandatory to eliminate the sovereign connections in certain Member States as the risk 
would be shared among them and consequently the Banking Union’s objectives would 
be reinforced. Nonetheless, there would be measures that would reduce risk 
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designated to stop the bank-sovereign relation in a direct manner (European 
Commission, 2015). 
The Scope & Objectives 
The scope of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme is associated with the 
determination of which Member States would be eligible for the provision of liquidity 
coverage. According to the proposal of European Commission, all banking institutions 
would receive the coverage. There is evidence according to which a shared system 
would function more sufficiently offering an increased level of shielding without 
needing to upsurge total contributions. Additionally, it would eliminate the states’ 
exposure to their internal banking sector. 
There are objectives with a potential positive outcome to the internal market, 
the shielding of the consumers and the fiscal stability in general (Five Presidents’ 
Report Series, 2015).  
The Stages for the establishment of EDIS 
As mentioned earlier, there will be a phased development of EDIS – first a 
reinsurance arrangement and then an increasing level of co-insurance until full 
mutualisation is achieved. EDIS has the mission to address the fundamental need of 
the Member State to reimburse depositors within the disbursement deadline 
established by the Directive and please the call for involvement to an on-time 
resolution procedure. European Deposit Insurance Scheme would ensure losses by 
refunding depositors or getting involved in the resolution.  
Reinsurance 
The phase of reinsurance is intended to last three years during which EDIS 
would provide a limited funding and involves a distribution of the losses of the DGSs 
which is associated to a payout event or a contribution to resolution. At the beginning 
of this stage there is a limit related to coverage resolution proceedings which are 
arranged by the Board. However, proceedings associated with national resolution are 
covered by the next two stages. 
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The funding of this stage would be given in cases of a liquidity shortfall of the 
DGSs which participate. The procedure associated with it depends on the possibility of 
meeting a disbursement event by the DGS or the contribution to resolutions. If there is 
a disbursement event, the liquidity shortfall happens when the deposits which are 
covered within the fading bank is of larger amount than the amount of the financial 
resources available by the DGS. The amount of deposits which are covered and are 
employed to calculate the shortfall is comprised of eligible deposits which reach the 
amount of 100,000 euro or the equivalent amount of money in the national currency. 
The employment of the supposed amount of the available financial resources rather 
than the actual one has the potential to weaken the members’ incentive to fall short of 
their responsibility to “raise ex-ante contributions in line with a precise funding path” 
(European Commission, 2015, p.10). At last, if ex-post contributions can be withdrawn 
within a short time period, they can become an additional means of liquidity that could 
reduce the shortfall of a Member State. A period of three days is the time during which 
the liquidity resources of the DGS should be exhausted. Then, the depositors should be 
paid in seven working days after the payout event. 
The case of resolution is inspected in the Article 41 b (2) according to which 
liquidity shortfall consists of what the DGS which participate in the Banking Union have 
to offer to resolution. There is a hypothetical level of financial means which constitutes 
the sole financial resource that the DGS which participate in the EBU need to tap to 
eliminate any liquidity shortfall. In the case of resolution DGSs are not expected to 
offer more resources as according to the Article 10 (8) the DGS Directive is concerned 
only with the payout events.  
In case the DGS experiences a liquidity shortfall, it may ask for 20% of the funds 
of the amount of shortfall. The rest 80% of the shortfall has to be covered by other 
resources. The application of the hypothetical financial resources that are available by 
each DGS allows the calculation of the liquidity shortfall of DGS permitted by the EDIS 
during the payout event. (European Commission, 2015). 
In this phase, European Deposit Insurance Scheme has to provide the funding 
for the liquidity shortfall as well as an additional 20% of the DGS’ additional loss. The 
concept of excess loss either refers to the payout events that DGS may encounter or its 
contribution to resolution. In the case of a payout event, DGS experiences an excess 
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loss when the total amount that it gave to depositors transcend the amount that it had 
collected in insolvency proceedings on the claims of the deposits that it had obtained 
by paying back depositors.  
When the liquidity shortfall is examined, the scheming associated with the 
excess loss that has taken place during the reinsurance stage can have its base on the 
amounts that have been given to the depositors.  This sum is eliminated by the 
earnings from the liquidation state that the DGS has established. In addition, the 
supposed amount of the financial resources that are available by the DGS at the 
payout event is removed too. Finally, the DGS is supposed to have the capability to 
provide the amount of ex-post aids which is allowed to have by the DGS Directive 
within one year from the incidence of the disbursement event. This sum is equal to the 
0,5 % of the deposits which have been covered by the banks that are associates of the 
DGS Directive with the aids which were withdrawn during the first three days after the 
disbursement. The amount that results comprises of the extra loss of the DGS. 
According to the Article 41 in case of a resolution event, the extra loss 
comprises of the sum that the DGS has to provide to resolution. The sum may have 
been payed after a subsequent assessment which found out that its provision should 
have been lowered comparing to what was requested at a first place. Furthermore, the 
sum of financial resources that the DGS had available should have been provided by 
the funding solution which was established by Article 41. In this case, it is not 
necessary for the DGS to increase its ex-post involvement as the Article 10 (8) limits it 
to payout events. The application of the 20% of the excess occurs by eliminating the 
sum of funding which the DGS is obliged to give back to the European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme by the sum of loss cove (European Commission, 2015).  
Co-insurance  
Co-insurance is the subsequent stage which will take place after the completion 
of the previous stage which is expected to last three years. At this stage DGSs are co-
insured by the European Deposit Insurance Scheme for a period of four years and have 
the right to ask for funding as well as loss cover from the Deposit Insurance Fund when 
they experience a payout event or have been asked to participate in the funding of a 
resolution. At this phase European Deposit Insurance Scheme is responsible for the 
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provision of funding and the coverage of losses which come from the contributions to 
national resolution events. Furthermore, it provides the same amount of the loss the 
DGS ultimately experiences from the events stated. The percentage would be 20 % one 
year after the co-insurance stage and upsurges each year by 20 %.  
When a disbursement event happens, the liquidity requirement is equivalent to 
the sum of deposits that are covered by the failing bank. When there is a resolution 
procedure, the liquidity requirement is equivalent to the sum of involvement that is 
asked by the Board and the resolution mechanism at a national level.  
This stage is distinguished from the previous one regarding the subsidy that is 
provided as well as the damage that is covered by the European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme which will be augmented gradually. 
Full Insurance 
Following the co-insurance stage which is expected to last four years, the 
Member States will receive full insurance by the European Deposit Insurance Scheme. 
This stage offers full funding and covers all losses which come from payments or 
contributions to resolution events. The resolution mechanism is the same with the 
previous stages, while the only difference is that the European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme is responsible for the coverage of the total amount of liquidity needs. 
However, in case that Member States do not comply with the responsibilities 
associated with the Regulations mentioned, they will be covered by EDIS only if their 
fiscal means are equal to the consistent fund path that is established by the Article 41j. 
This limitation is adopted to ensure that the Member States can comply with their 
obligations which eliminate the risks of reducing the liquidity of the European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme (European Commission, 2015) . 
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Oppositions to the creation of EDIS 
However, there are Member States, mainly the more financially powerful ones, 
which disagree with the risk-sharing plans, based on the existence of many European 
countries with rotten banking sectors. These countries should clean up their banking 
sector in order to eliminate their systemic risk and then an agreement of all Member 
States would be probably reached. For instance, according to Germany, it is an urgent 
precondition that countries such as Italy and Portugal get rid of non-performing loans 
so as Germany places its money in shared funds to protect deposits and lenders from 
possible failures. 
The European Commission decided to propose additional capital rules for the 
eurozone’s lenders, incorporating tighter standards with the mission to make the 
banking system safer. Nevertheless, Germany as well as the Netherlands did not 
recognize the measures claiming that they are not enough to eliminate the risks and 
asked for tougher requirements. It is believed that the fragile Italian banking sector 
with the third biggest lender Monte dei Paschi di Siena which was entangled for long 
time to close a large capital shortfall made Germany more reluctant to approve plans 
of risk-sharing (Howard & Quaglia, 2016). 
Similar oppositions were made by Danish political parties which claimed that 
they will seek for a referendum if Danish government decides to join the Banking 
Union. The parties which opposed to the Banking Union developments were the 
Eurosceptic Danish People’s Party, the Red Green Alliance and the Liberal Alliance and 
all together were able to gain adequate seats to call for a referendum according to the 
political developments at a European level (Matzen, 2015). 
Thus, a Banking Union is a part of long-term institutional framework which is 
not accessible because of problems of legacy. Hence, only intermediate solutions 
appear to be achievable. Direct banks’ recapitalisation is partly the responsibility of 
national governments which have the liability for their banks resolution. According to a 
proposal by the German Council of Economic Experts, there was an advocacy for the 
“foundation of a Redemption Pact at a European Level” which would include a part of 
the liability of the states’ sovereign debt which remains above the verge of 60 % when 
at the same time there would be an introduction of strict financial measures as well as 
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a sovereign liquidation management. The common theme that is reflected is that the 
banking and the sovereign issues have to be resolved simultaneously as they are 
strongly interrelated (Buch and Weigert, 2012). 
It is believed that institutional solutions as well as solutions associated to the 
ongoing financial crisis should be separated in order to transform the eurozone into a 
sustainable currency union. The way to achieve this goal is with the construction of the 
Banking Union. The employment of European deposit insurance may overshadow 
significant changes in the architecture of the European Union and introduce 
distributional conflicts associated with the resolution of the fiscal crisis.  
The macroeconomic inequities in the European Union are the main issue that 
explains the desire of the northern European countries to protect their savings. It is 
suggested that the provision of a supervisory authority to the European Central Bank 
could have a significant impact that would allow the Single European Market to 
function and restart growing particularly in peripheral countries and hence reducing 
the consequences of financial policy.  
There is an ongoing debate according to which the immense imbalances in the 
payment system of the Eurozone reflect the sponsoring of frail banks in southern 
countries by national banks which are financed by the target system. This funding of 
the banks without the necessary haircuts depicts the delay in addressing appropriately 
the bank fragility in southern countries. Therefore, a European Deposit Insurance 
would not be able to resolve imbalances, yet it needs to be accompanied by 
addressing the sovereign fragility effectively in peripheral countries (Beck, 2012). 
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Conclusions 
After the financial crisis of 2008 in Europe, the need to address the weak 
aspects of the financial sector became urgent in order to reestablish the confidence of 
the investors and protect the citizens’ deposits. The cost of the restoration of banks 
was especially high for the taxpayers, borrowers and depositors. As Draghi stated in 
2013 when he was the president of the Central Bank, the crisis established the need 
for a common financial prosperity. 
 The creation of a Banking Union would shield the Eurozone area from potential 
risks, it would upgrade the Single Market and make the banks safer having the chance 
to offer access to financial resources which will be employed to achieve investments 
and growth. The trust will be rebuilt not only among European banking structures but 
also among the shareholders and the stakeholders. 
The Banking Union is a goal associated with many legal issues that have to be 
solved. Considering that there used to be nineteen different supervisory mechanisms 
at a national level, everything seemed complicated. However, the first steps towards 
its implementation were made with the creation of the mechanisms of SSM and SRM: 
the two main pillars of the establishment of the European Banking Union. The former 
establishes the supervision procedures that the Central Bank of Europe provides and 
the latter the Resolution procedures that regulate the resolution of credit institutions 
within the Eurozone. 
However, the third pillar, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, still remains 
the missing piece despite the significant advantages associated with its 
implementation. With a purely national Deposit Guarantee Scheme, a large local shock 
is sufficient to leave depositors unprotected. A common European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme would have the potential to upgrade the capacity of national DGS to withstand 
local shocks and distribute the risks associated with “pay-out events” as well as 
resolution procedures. Consequently, there would be a more effective protection of 
the fiscal system and the financial market as well as citizens’ deposits in case a 
domestic credit institution fails. During the last financial crisis in Eurozone, the majority 
of problems were experienced by the states with weaker banking sectors. Since that, 
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the European Commission and the European Central Bank have passed several 
Regulations preparing the ground for the implementation of the EDIS, but have not 
achieve to finally implement it. 
The reason behind this situation is the various oppositions that have been 
expressed by the more financially powerful Member States which fear that their 
contribution to the European Deposit Insurance Scheme would be higher. The risk- 
sharing model is not a popular idea for the citizens of Northern Europe who know that 
they would have to pay more for the southern problematic banks of European 
Member States. The high level of debt in Southern European countries as well as the 
non-performing loans is considered a threat for countries like Germany which perceive 
this idea as an attack to their citizens’ savings. However, Germany that is opposed to 
the establishment of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme will gain many benefits 
from a stable banking system as there would not only be risk sharing but risk reduction 
as well (Schoenmaker et al, 2016). 
However, risks related to procedures that seem unclear and the inadequacy of 
information that is available for domestic banking sectors of each Member State lead 
to the inability of Eurozone countries to reach an agreement. Despite the evidence 
associated with the financial stability that the insurance scheme has the potential to 
offer, many countries are still not be able to pass the relevant regulations because of 
their voters’ oppositions to them. 
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